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The Long Shadow of Job Loss:
Britain’s Older Industrial Towns in the
21st Century
Christina Beatty* and Steve Fothergill
Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, United Kingdom
This article takes a long view of economic change in Britain’s older industrial towns,
drawing on the authors’ accumulated research into labor market trends in the places and
communities most affected by deindustrialization. It begins by documenting the industrial
job losses over the last 50 years and their impact on unemployment, economic inactivity
and welfare benefit claims, highlighting the diversion onto incapacity benefits triggered
by job loss that remains a major feature of the towns. It then looks at the evidence on the
present-day labor market in the towns, identifying job growth at a slower pace than in the
cities and continuing weaknesses in terms of earnings, qualifications and occupational
mix. These are the on-going problems the authors describe as the ‘long shadow of job
loss’. The evidence also shows that despite years of job loss, industry remains a key
component of the towns’ economy and that the towns are increasingly connected to
surrounding areas, including nearby cities, by strong commuting flows.
Keywords: industry, towns, employment, welfare benefits, UK
AIM OF THE PAPER
A widely-held view of the UK economy is that it has become ‘deindustrialized.’ The world’s first
industrial nation now employs far fewer workers in manufacturing and mining than was the case
fifty or more years ago and the economy as a whole is now dominated by jobs and output in the
service sector. That this deindustrialization has happened in the UK is indisputable but the massive
consequences for the individuals and communities that once depended upon industry for their
livelihood are only poorly understood.
This is the gap in knowledge that the present paper helps to fill by bringing to bear statistical
evidence on the contemporary labor market in the places hardest hit by deindustrialization. In
doing so, the paper is also intended to provide a context for the others in this volume.
Specifically, the paper summarizes the evidence from the authors’ own research, now extending
over three decades, into employment, unemployment and welfare benefits across the UK and adds a
quantitative overview of the contemporary labormarket in Britain’s older industrial towns, drawing
on official statistics and the authors’ most recent research. Job losses, labor market adjustment and
the contemporary labor market in older industrial towns have been covered in an earlier report
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2018). Here the empirical evidence has been comprehensively up-dated,
mostly from 2016 to 2019, and the conclusions revised accordingly.
BACKGROUND
Because so many of Britain’s industrial job losses happened a generation or more ago and because
so many of the redundant workers have themselves reached pension age or died it has become
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easy to assume that the problems arising from deindustrialization
have passed into history. Indeed, as the second decade of the
twenty first century drew to a close official figures pointed
to unemployment levels in the UK that were lower than at
any time since the mid-1970s, when large-scale industrial job
losses were only just beginning to get underway. If official
unemployment data is the preferred guide, then the problems
arising from deindustrialization do indeed appear to have
been overcome.
There are however more dimensions to labor market
disadvantage than just unemployment, and national figures
almost always hide important differences between places.
Britain’s older industrial towns—the smaller places beyond the
big cities that generally have an industrial history extending
far back into the nineteenth century—are where so much of
British industry was once concentrated. These are the places
where the loss of industrial jobs is likely to have been most
keenly felt and where we might expect to observe lasting impacts.
By contrast, although Britain’s cities too nearly all have an
industrial past they have always played a wider role in regional
and local economies as service centers for their hinterlands,
administrative headquarters, transport hubs and as home to
major universities.
The recession provoked by the 2008 financial crisis was
in many ways a wake-up call, prompting a rediscovery of
the divergent labor market trends between North and South
(Gardiner et al., 2013) and between city regions (Townsend and
Champion, 2014; Centre for Cities, 2015; Swinney and Thomas,
2015; Martin et al., 2016; Pike et al., 2016). In particular, there has
been a growing realization that Britain’s older industrial towns
may not after all be well on the way to recovery. In the 2016
referendum on EU membership, for example, older industrial
towns in England and Wales generally voted ‘leave’ by a margin
of two-to-one (Jennings, 2017). This has been widely interpreted
as a reflection of rising disaffection and disenchantment with the
economic impacts of globalization and deindustrialization. The
big cities, by contrast, mostly voted ‘remain.’
As the realization of on-going problems has grown, the term
‘left behind places’ has gained widespread use in British political
debate and it has been applied in particular to older industrial
towns. A sign of shifting priorities has been the UK government’s
announcement of Town Deals, which make available additional
funding for economic and social development (Ministry of
Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2019). Of the
first 100 towns across England invited to submit bids to
the new fund, rather more than half could be described as
‘older industrial.’
Britain is not unique of course in having towns that have lost
most or all of their original industrial base. Deindustrialization
also characterizes parts of North East France, the former East
Germany and the ‘rustbelt’ of the United States, to mention
just three other examples. In Britain, however, the original
industrialization happened earlier and the efforts to rebuild
economies have mostly been in place longer. Reflecting the
research on which it is based, the evidence in this paper focusses
exclusively on Britain but there may well be pointers to the
experience in other developed, post-industrial economies.
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
The next section of the paper summarizes the industrial job losses
that have taken place in recent decades in Britain, and their
distinctive geography. The following section looks at how the
labor market adjusted to these job losses, highlighting the extent
to which the impacts have been on labor force participation rather
than recorded unemployment.
The core of the paper then looks at the contemporary labor
market in Britain’s older industrial towns, presenting a range
of new evidence covering employment, unemployment and
economic inactivity, industry mix, job quality, skills, pay and
welfare benefits. This is preceded by a short section on a working
definition of the towns, necessary in order to deploy a range of
official statistics.
The final part of the paper considers the labor market links
between older industrial towns and neighboring cities, before
concluding with an assessment of the position that Britain’s older
industrial towns occupy in the economy of the early twenty
first century.
THE DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL
BRITAIN
Employment in British manufacturing peaked in 1966 when 8.9
million people worked in this sector, accounting for 30% of all
employment. By 2019, the UK government’s Office for National
Statistics put the numbers employed in manufacturing at just 2.7
million, or 7.7% of the employed workforce.
UK manufacturing employment fell especially steeply in the
early 1980s during a recession triggered by a high exchange rate
and high interest rates. The job losses during these years were
documented in particular by Townsend (1983) and Fothergill and
Guy (1991) and the process of deindustrialization more generally
by Martin and Rowthorn (1986). The recession of the early
1990s added further major job losses (Gudgin, 1995). Thereafter,
manufacturing output largely stagnated and manufacturing
employment continued to slide even though the UK economy
as a whole enjoyed 15 years of sustained economic growth.
The recession triggered by the 2008 financial crisis reduced
UK manufacturing employment still further and during the
subsequent economic recovery manufacturing employment did
no more than stabilize at a new lower level.
The coal industry’s job losses go back much further. When
UK coal production peaked in 1913, 1.1 million miners were
employed in over 3,000 mines. For much of the rest of the
twentieth century employment in the UK coal industry fell,
though there were still 450,000 miners working in the mid-1960s.
The more recent job losses began in earnest after the year-long
miners’ strike of 1984/5, which failed in its attempt to stop pit
closures, and the final colliery closed in 2015.
The shift from industrial to service sector employment is
not unique to the UK. In all advanced economies it has its
roots in differential rates of growth in labor productivity—it is
generally easier to replace people by machines in manufacturing
than in most service activities—and the shift away from
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industry has been accentuated by globalization, which has
resulted in much routine production moving to China and
other emerging economies. In the UK, however, the process
of deindustrialization has probably gone further and faster
than elsewhere.
The UK’s industrial job losses have been concentrated in
specific parts of the country. Partly this reflects the distribution
of manufacturing, which was always more important in some
places than others, but partly it reflects the location of the
industries such as coal, steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering and
textiles and clothing that experienced the biggest reduction in
employment. Figure 1 illustrates the geography of this job loss.
This map flags up the most significant job losses, in places where
major industries have been reduced to a fraction of their former
size or disappeared entirely. The closure of individual large plants
accounts for some of these job losses butmore often, in the case of
the coal and textile industries for example, the job losses affected
several sites across neighboring towns.
Manufacturing employment has fallen in just about all parts
of the UK but the concentration of industrial job losses north of a
line from the Severn estuary to the Wash is especially noticeable.
It is the cities, towns and coalfield areas of the Midlands, North,
Scotland and Wales that have been hit hardest—a pattern that
will be familiar to anyone with a basic knowledge of Britain’s
economic geography.
LABOR MARKET ADJUSTMENT
The first and most obvious consequence of the large-scale loss of
industrial jobs was a rise in the number claiming unemployment
benefits. This hovered around 3 million for several years in
the 1980s but fell away after the recession of the early 1990s,
eventually to less than 1 million for most of the 2000s.
By the end of the 1990s, however, it was clear that the job
shortfalls across Britain were highly uneven and that they were
no longer accurately reflected by unemployment data (MacKay,
1999; Webster, 2000; Erdem and Glyn, 2001). The present
authors’ research on the coalfields shed important new light. In
this part of Britain, the mines had mostly closed but claimant
unemployment was no higher than when the mines had been
working. The evidence on the coalfields showed that the main
consequence of job loss was in fact a diversion of working age
men into ‘economic inactivity’ and in particular into what the
Census called ‘permanent sickness’—in practice a withdrawal
from the labor market onto incapacity benefits (Beatty and
Fothergill, 1996).
A decade later, a follow-up study (Beatty et al., 2007) identified
growing job creation in the former coalfields but confirmed
the observation that the principal labor market adjustment in
response to the loss of mining jobs was an increase in economic
inactivity among working age men. By this stage many of the ex-
miners had themselves reached state pension age so it was clear
that the continuing high level of economic inactivity among men
must be spread more widely across the local workforce. Indeed, it
appeared that job loss for one generation was being passed on as
higher economic inactivity among the next.
The labor market adjustments in the coalfields were not
unique. Across the whole of older industrial Britain, from the
mid-1980s through to the early 2000s, the numbers out of the
labor market—‘economically inactive’—on incapacity benefits
surged to unprecedented highs. This triggered the argument that
much of the increase was a form of ‘hidden unemployment’—
men and women who in a fully employed economy might
have been expected to be in work but whose health problems
or disabilities entitled them to incapacity benefits instead of
unemployment benefits (Beatty and Fothergill, 2005).
The increase in the numbers claiming incapacity benefits
occurred among women as well as men. At first this seemed hard
to understand because many of the older industries shedding
jobs—coal and steel for example—had a predominantly male
workforce. The explanation turned out to be that in older
industrial areas and elsewhere the male and female sides of the
labor market interact, so the competition for jobs transmits a
shortfall in opportunities for men into a difficult labor market
for women in the same places. When women with health
problems or disabilities are out-of-work they generally then claim
incapacity benefits in the same way as their male counterparts
(Beatty et al., 2009; Beatty, 2016).
Figure 2 shows the numbers claiming the three main out-of-
work benefits across Britain as a whole between 1979 and 2019.
By the end of this period, and before the recession triggered by the
coronavirus crisis, the numbers claiming unemployment-related
benefits were well down on the levels of the 1980s and early 1990s,
though there was an upturn in the late 2010s resulting from the
introduction of the UK’s new all-encompassing benefit, Universal
Credit, which counts partners and some on small hours or very
low pay. The numbers claiming lone parent benefits peaked in the
mid-1990s, when the evidence pointed to job loss among men as
a driving factor (Rowthorn and Webster, 2008), but have fallen
back as eligibility has been restricted just to those with the very
youngest children and, more recently, as Universal Credit has
been phased in.
The striking feature of Figure 2 is the rise in the numbers out-
of-work on incapacity-related benefits, these days Employment
and Support Allowance or, as the changeover takes place,
Universal Credit on the grounds of ill health or disability.
The numbers on these benefits rose from around 750,000 to a
plateau of more than 2.5 million in the early 2000s and have
subsequently only fallen to around 2.25 million. It is impossible
to explain the large increase in health terms alone at a time when
general standards of health and physical well-being have slowly
been improving.
The highest incapacity claimant rates are predominantly
in older industrial Britain. Exposure to industrial injury and
disease means that older industrial Britain has long had higher
levels of incapacitating ill health but the surge in incapacity
claimant numbers only occurred after the industrial jobs began
to disappear. Ill health or disability is not always an absolute bar
to employment, so what seems to have happened is that where
there are plenty of jobs themen and womenwith health problems
or disabilities have been able to hang on in employment or find
new work if they are made redundant. However, where the labor
market is more difficult, as in much of older industrial Britain, ill
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FIGURE 1 | Major industrial job losses across Britain since the early 1980s. Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2017).
health or disability has ruined many people’s chances of finding
and keeping work.
In effect, the job loss in older industrial Britain has led to
higher numbers out-of-work on benefits but not in ways that
were perhaps expected. It is the numbers on incapacity benefits,
not unemployment benefits, that in the long-run have been
impacted most.
Although the rise in incapacity claimant numbers is the
defining feature of labor market adjustment in much of older
industrial Britain the phenomenon is now past its peak. The
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 4 August 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 54
Beatty and Fothergill Britain’s Older Industrial Towns
FIGURE 2 | Working age benefit claimants, GB, 1979–2019. Source: Department for Work and Pensions.
national reduction in incapacity numbers since the early 2000s
has occurred particularly in older industrial areas, where the
claimant rate has typically fallen from above 10% of all adults of
working age to a new average of 7–8%, though still well above
the 3–4% in the more prosperous parts of southern England.
The most recent estimate of ‘hidden unemployment’ among
incapacity-related claimants, for 2017, puts the figure at 760,000,
well down on an estimated peak of 1.15 million in 2002 (Beatty
et al., 2017).
That incapacity numbers in older industrial Britain have fallen
back from peak levels owes something to job growth in these
places. In the former coalfields, for example, the number of
employee jobs increased by 138,000 between 2012 and 2017
(Beatty et al., 2019). The wider growth in UK employment since
2010 has also provided commuting opportunities, particularly
in nearby cities. Falling incapacity numbers probably also owe
something to revised medical assessments, more restrictive
entitlements and new conditionality for some, though the
increase in women’s state pension age has pushed in the opposite
direction, bringing an additional cohort of over-60s into the
scope of incapacity-related benefits.
THE CONTEMPORARY LABOR MARKET IN
BRITAIN’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL TOWNS
A Working Definition of the Towns
So what exactly does the labor market now look like in Britain’s
older industrial towns? The figures we are able to present here
are mostly for 2019—at the end of a sustained period of recovery
from the 2008 financial crisis but before the coronavirus crisis
hit economies across the world. The recession triggered by
coronavirus will have worsened labor market conditions just
about everywhere but its impact specifically on Britain’s older
industrial towns will take some while to become clear. It seems
unlikely, however, that deep-seated differences between places,
and in particular between older industrial towns and more
prosperous local economies, will be easily overturned.
Presenting quantitative evidence on the labor market in
Britain’s older industrial towns requires the use of local area
statistics, which in turn requires a working definition of the places
to be included. Although these towns are a substantial part of
the country there is no official definition of them to assist in the
deployment of statistics. In this article we therefore use the term
‘older industrial towns’ to include all Britain’s older industrial
areas beyond the main regional cities, and we use district and
unitary local authorities as the building block because they are the
smallest unit for which much of the contemporary labor market
data is available. The list of authorities is shown in Table 1. The
list is taken from our earlier report on older industrial towns
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2018) and has also been deployed in a
recent study of labor market adjustment (Beatty and Fothergill,
2020), where a fuller description can be found.
The core of the list comprises the former coalfields of the
Midlands, North, Scotland andWales, where somuch of the UK’s
early industrialization took place and where so many of the UK’s
older industries once flourished. The additions to this core cover
the locations of job loss from the UK’s main steelworks, shipyards
and concentrations of heavy engineering and chemicals. The list
also includes the former mill towns of Lancashire and West
Yorkshire, where the textile industry has all but disappeared. All
the local authorities are in parts of the country where job losses
from older industries have long posed a problem, in contrast to
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southern England where older industries were generally a smaller
component of the economy. In 2018 the local authorities on the
list had a combined population of 16.8 million, or 26% of the
GB total.
Four points are worth noting. First, some of the local
authorities actually cover substantial cities—Sunderland, Hull,
Bradford, Stoke and Swansea are examples—though none of
these are the main city within their region. Second, a number of
the local authorities cover numerous quite small towns, especially
TABLE 1 | Districts and unitary local authorities covering Britain’s older industrial
towns.
North East Yorkshire and Humber Scotland
County Durham Barnsley Clackmannanshire
Darlington Bradford Dundee
Gateshead Calderdale East Ayrshire
Hartlepool Doncaster East Dunbartonshire
Middlesbrough Hull East Lothian
North Tyneside Kirklees East Renfrewshire
Redcar and Cleveland NE Lincolnshire Falkirk
South Tyneside North Lincolnshire Fife




North West East Midlands Renfrewshire
Allerdale Amber Valley South Lanarkshire
Barrow in Furness Ashfield West Dunbartonshire




Chorley Erewash Blaenau Gwent
Copeland Gedling Bridgend
Halton Mansfield Caerphilly
Hyndburn Newark and Sherwood Carmarthenshire
Knowsley NE Derbyshire Flintshire
Oldham Merthyr Tydfil
Pendle Neath Port Talbot
Preston West Midlands Newport
Rochdale Dudley Rhondda Cynon Taf
Rossendale Newcastle under Lyme Swansea
Salford Sandwell Torfaen









Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2020).
in former mining areas such as County Durham. Third, some
of the local authorities include rural areas just as some of the
obvious omissions (Northumberland is an example) include sub-
areas that are older industrial in character. Fourth, the sheer
extent of job loss over the years means that in some cases
‘industrial’ may no longer be a very good description of the
present-day town.
Labor Market Status
It is useful to begin by looking in Table 2 at the labor market
status of working-age (16–64 years old) residents in Britain’s
older industrial towns. The figures here show that of the more
than 10 million working age residents in the towns, 7.5 million
were in work in 2019—an employment rate of 73%.
By comparison, recorded unemployment was modest—just
380,000, equivalent to 3.7% of the working age population.
The unemployment figure here comes from the government’s
Annual Population Survey and uses the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment, which counts
anyone who is out-of-work, available to start work within 2
weeks and has looked for work within the last 4 weeks. The ILO
unemployment figures do not depend on benefit status and in the
years following the financial crisis have been notably higher than
UK claimant count. The 3.7% of the workforce unemployed in
older industrial towns on the ILO measure is therefore actually
the higher of the UK’s two official unemployment estimates,
which underlines the extent to which recorded unemployment
had receded prior to the coronavirus crisis.
The remaining adults of working age fall into a number of
categories. In Britain’s older industrial towns there were rather
more than 500,000 students, many of whom will be still at school
or college rather than in higher education. There were more than
500,000 who look after family or home on a full-time basis, and
300,000 who described themselves as ‘retired.’
At 730,000, and accounting for 7.1% of all adults of working
age, the single largest group of among the non-employed in
the towns were the temporary and long-term sick, of whom
all but 50,000 were in the long-term category. The Annual
Population Survey tends to under-record the size of this group:
in older industrial towns in May 2019, Department for Work and
TABLE 2 | Labor market status of 16–64 years olds in older industrial towns,
2019.
No. %
In employment 7,510,000 73.1
ILO unemployed 380,000 3.7
Students 540,000 5.3
Looking after family/home 560,000 5.5
Temporary and long-term sick 730,000 7.1
Retired 300,000 2.9
Other 230,000 2.2
All 16–64 year olds 10,270,000 100.0
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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Pensions benefit data put the number of 16–64 year olds out-of-
work and claiming incapacity-related benefits at 776,000, or 7.5%
of all adults of working age. These figures underline the point
that a diversion out of the labor market onto incapacity benefits
remains a key feature of the towns. Indeed, with roughly a quarter
of the GB population, Britain’s older industrial towns are home to
more than a third of the country’s incapacity-related claimants.
Table 3 draws comparisons between older industrial towns,
the main regional cities, London and the GB average. There
are similarities and important differences. On the ILO measure
of unemployment there is little to differentiate older industrial
towns: the rate in 2019 was a little higher than the national
average but a little below the level in the main regional cities. In
contrast, the incapacity-related claimant rate in older industrial
towns (7.5%) was higher than the rate in the main regional cities
(7.1%) and well above the GB average (5.7%) and the rate in
London (4.4%).
The employment rate—the share of adults of working age
in work—paints a complex picture. On the raw figures, the
employment rate in older industrial towns in 2019 does not
appear unduly low—a little lower than the GB average or than
in London but distinctly higher than in the main regional cities.
The raw figures are however misleading. The big distortion
is the distribution of students across the country, who are
concentrated in London and the main regional cities where so
many universities are located. In older industrial towns students
accounted for just over 5% of all 16–64 year olds; in the main
regional cities they accounted for nearer 10%. This distortion
to the figures has always existed but as student numbers have
increased it has become more important.
A better measure is therefore the employment rate excluding
students. This points to older industrial towns as a whole lagging
three percentage points behind the national average. It also
narrows the gap between older industrial towns and the main
regional cities. On this measure the labor market in older
industrial towns looks less convincingly healthy.













3.7 4.2 3.8 3.3
Incapacity-related
claimant rate**
7.5 7.1 4.4 5.7
Employment rate 73.1 69.9 74.5 75.6
Students 5.3 9.7 7.0 5.7
Employment rate
excluding students
77.2 77.4 80.1 80.1
*Birmingham, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle
upon Tyne, Nottingham and Sheffield (all defined as their local authority district).
**May 2019. Includes individuals with limited capacity to work transferred to
Universal Credit.
All figures are percentages of 16–64 year old residents.
Sources: Annual Population Survey, Department for Work and Pensions.
Employment Structure
Table 4 shows the sectoral breakdown of the jobs in older
industrial towns. In total 6.4 million jobs were located in the
towns in 2019. Manufacturing, energy and water—‘industry’—
accounted for one-in-seven, or 950,000 jobs in total. These days
employment in older industrial towns is dominated by the service
sector, particularly by over 2 million jobs in education, health and
public administration, which will mostly be in the public sector,
and by retail, distribution, hotels and related activities (a further
1.2 million in 2019).
The number of jobs in public services, such as schools
and hospitals, is in most places driven by the size of the
local population and many jobs in other parts of the service
sector, such as retailing, follow local spending power, which is
population-related. By contrast, jobs in businesses that serve
markets beyond the local area, includingmost manufacturing but
also some parts of the service sector, play a key role in driving
the whole local economy because they bring in income to an area
which then recirculates and supports other local businesses and
jobs. Manufacturing’s on-going significance to the economy of
older industrial towns is therefore substantially greater than its
share of employment.
Table 5 compares employment in older industrial towns with
the main regional cities, London and the national average. This
bears out the point that jobs in several parts of the service sector—
retailing and public services for example—are found in large
numbers in all areas because they are tied to population. The
differences between older industrial towns and other places are
in other sectors.
In particular, despite years of decline which has often led to
the disappearance of whole industries, Britain’s older industrial
towns continue to have a higher proportion of jobs in industry
than the economy as a whole, than the main regional cities or
than London in particular. These may be ‘older industrial towns’
but they remain to a large extent the heartland of British industry.
The converse is that older industrial towns have proportionally
fewer jobs in banking, finance and business services than either
the main regional cities or London. The drivers of the economy
of older industrial towns remain very different from those in
London or the main regional cities.
TABLE 4 | Industry breakdown of jobs in older industrial towns, 2019.
No. %
Manufacturing, energy and water 950,000 14.7
Construction 460,000 7.1
Retail, distribution, hotels etc. 1,260,000 19.6
Transport and communications 510,000 7.9
Banking, finance and business services 810,000 12.6
Education, health and public admin 2,080,000 32.4
Other services 330,000 5.2
All jobs 6,440,000 100.0
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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15 8 4 11
Construction 7 7 7 7
Retail, distribution,
hotels etc.
20 17 14 18
Transport and
communications
8 9 13 9
Banking, finance and
business services
13 20 29 18
Education, health and
public admin
32 34 26 30
Other services 5 5 7 6
All jobs 100 100 100 100
Source: Annual Population Survey.
Job Quality and the Workforce
In older industrial towns the shift from mining and
manufacturing to new forms of employment has inevitably
resulted in major changes in the experience of work. The
qualitative aspects of these changes—job satisfaction, a sense of
identity, and control over tasks and workload for example—are
very real no doubt, and deserving of study. Here we are limited
to the insights that official statistics are able to offer.
Table 6 brings together a number of indicators, again for 2019.
These cover the nature of the employment in older industrial
towns and two measures of the local workforce—the proportion
of working age residents with degree-level qualifications and the
proportion born outside the UK.
One of the widespread assumptions about the UK labor
market is that as the economy recovered from the recession
caused by the 2008 financial crisis the growth in employment
was skewed toward part-time and insecure working, including
debased forms of self-employment. A common assumption, too,
is that these forms of employment became particularly prevalent
in weaker local economies, such as much of older industrial
Britain, where welfare reforms made it increasingly difficult
for many claimants to stay on benefits. The proliferation of
‘self-employed’ delivery workers and taxi drivers, for example,
was in the popular view been a defining feature of the
last decade.
The first line of Table 6 shows that in fact self-employment in
older industrial towns accounts for a below national average share
of the workforce and a considerably smaller proportion than in
London. This snapshot for 2019 does not however tell the full
story because ‘self-employment’ has gradually been increasing.
Expressed as a proportion of all employed residents, the increase
since 2010 in older industrial towns was only 1 percentage point,
on top of a 1 percentage point increase between 2000 and 2010,
but the absolute numbers are substantial—an increase of 140,000
between 2010 and 2019. Self-employment accounted for 30% of
the increase in residents in employment in older industrial towns
between 2010 and 2019.













11 12 18 14
Part-time work (% of
jobs in area)
25 22 19 25
White-collar jobs* (%
of jobs in area)
39 50 60 47
Degree or equivalent**
(% of 16–64 year
olds)***
31 41 53 39
Born outside UK (% of
16–64 year olds)***
10 23 44 19
*Managerial, professional, associate professional and technical occupations.
**NVQ level 4 or higher.
***Data for year to end 2018.
Source: Annual Population Survey.
The increase in self-employment is probably unwelcome. As
the UK government itself has documented (Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2016), the self-employed as a
group have seen falling incomes since the post-financial crisis
recession, which mostly reflects their changing composition as
a group. The modern self-employed worker is less likely to be
a prosperous entrepreneur or freelance worker than a quasi-
employee with diminished employment rights.
The second line of Table 6 deals with part-time employment.
This points to a share of jobs in older industrial towns that is only
a little higher than in the main regional cities and in line with
the GB average, and in older industrial towns the share fell by
1 percentage point between 2010 and 2019. Once again, the raw
figures do not tell the whole story. According to the government’s
Annual Population Survey, 2.5 million people across the UK as a
whole were ‘underemployed’ in 2019 in that they wanted to work
more hours, were able to start to do so within 2 weeks and were
already working less than full-time. This was down on the peak
level of around 3.1million in the wake of recession but still higher
than the pre-recession figure of just below 2 million. Across the
UK, around one-in-ten part-time workers say they could not find
a full-time job.
Additionally, there has been an increase in the number of
employees on zero hours contracts (Office for National Statistics,
2018). A government survey of businesses puts the figure for
2017 at 1.8 million contracts that did not guarantee a minimum
number of hours. The Annual Population Survey puts the
national figure for 2019 at 900,000, or 2.7% of all people in
employment. Since 2010 the numbers have risen sharply from
around 200,000 but the Office for National Statistics takes the
view that part of the observed increase appears to be due to
increased recognition and awareness of this form of employment.
No local figures are available. According to the Office for National
Statistics, the people on zero hours contracts are more likely
to be young, part-time, women or in full-time education when
compared with other people in employment, and only around
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a quarter say they would like more hours, mostly in their
current job.
Across the UK as a whole, the Annual Population Survey
points to 3% of workers with second jobs, and 4% in temporary
employment. Of those in temporary employment, a quarter say
this is because they could not find a permanent job, a proportion
that has fallen from around 40% in the immediate wake of
the financial crisis. Again, no local figures are available but the
small national percentages with second jobs or in temporary
employment suggest that both are likely to be relatively marginal
features of the labor market in older industrial towns, though
that does not rule out the possibility of increases since the
pre-financial crisis years.
But if self-employment and part-time working (and possibly
zero hours contracts, second jobs and temporary working) do not
sharply differentiate older industrial areas from other places the
remaining indicators in Table 6 most certainly do. The share of
white-collar jobs is far below the level in the cities, the proportion
of the workforce educated to degree level is far lower and so is the
proportion of the workforce born outside the UK.
There are issues here of cause-and-effect. One interpretation
could be that it is the location of white-collar jobs that follows the
location of highly educated workers. There will always be cases
that fit this model. A more likely model is that the composition
of the workforce in older industrial towns reflects the nature of
the job opportunities and that there is a migration of highly-
educated workers out of the towns to the cities where they
are more likely to find appropriate employment. Some of this
will occur as school-leavers from the towns move to university,
mostly in the cities, and then never return. At the extreme,
London’s exceptionally high proportion of graduates clearly
reflects the availability of higher-level jobs that attract graduates
from elsewhere in Britain and from the rest of the world. The
industrial and service jobs that form such a large component
of the economy in older industrial towns do not have the same
magnetic appeal.
Likewise, the low proportion of the workforce born outside
the UK at least in part reflects the long-term weakness of the
economy in older industrial towns. Migrants are attracted to
the places where jobs are more readily available. It should be
no surprise, therefore, that international migrants are fewer in
number in towns where the economic base has been eroded.
There are exceptions of course—Bradford and the Lancashire
mill towns are examples, where there continues to be in-
migration to established Asian communities. As a general rule,
however, it is the strength of the local economy to which we
should look for the prime explanation.
Pay and Welfare Benefits
Table 7 compares the median weekly earnings of employees in
older industrial towns with the equivalent figures for the main
regional cities, London and the GB average. The first part of
the table shows the figures for the jobs located in the area and
demonstrates that in older industrial towns these jobs pay less
than the national average, less than in the main regional cities
and substantially less than in London. The median earnings of
TABLE 7 | Median earnings: comparisons, 2019.
Older industrial Main regional London GB
towns cities
Jobs in area
Gross weekly pay £ 438 £ 481 £ 634 £ 479
GB = 100 91 100 132 100
Residents
Gross weekly pay £ 449 £ 446 £ 589 £ 479
GB = 100 94 93 123 100
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.






No. of households in
receipt
903,000 303,000 386,000 2,932,000
GB = 100* 120 108 89 100
Average annualized
value (£)
6,479 6,922 7,693 6,726
Total expenditure (£bn) 6.0 2.2 3.0 19.7
Expenditure per
16–64 year old (£)
576 559 498 490
*No. of households in receipt relative to working age population.
Source: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
jobs in London are almost £200 a week (or 45%) higher than in
older industrial towns.
The second part of the table shows the earnings of residents.
On this measure, older industrial towns are still below the
national average and well below the level in London, though in
both cases by a smaller margin, but residents’ earnings are much
the same as in the main regional cities. The differences between
the two halves of the table reflect the influence of commuting:
some of the residents of older industrial towns fill higher-paid
jobs in the cities.
One of the consequences of low pay in older industrial towns
is that there is a substantial financial burden on the Exchequer.
This occurs because the UK tax and benefit system operates to
prop up household incomes not just for those out-of-work but
also for those in low-paid employment. To illustrate this point,
Table 8 looks at in-work households in receipt of Tax Credits.
These figures are for the 2015/16 financial year—the last before
Tax Credits began to be subsumed into Universal Credit and as
a result difficult to disentangle as a separate category—but it is
unlikely that the geography and to some extent the magnitude of
the payments will have changed radically.
The absolute numbers for older industrial towns are large. In
total, just over 900,000 in-work households in the towns received
an annualized average of almost £6,500 in Tax Credits, at a cost
to the Exchequer of £6bn a year. What is also clear is that the
cost to the Exchequer of Tax Credits is greater in older industrial
towns than in the cities. This is not because the size of the average
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claim is higher—in fact it is lower in older industrial towns than
in the cities—but because low wages bring larger numbers of
households into the scope of Tax Credits. Averaged across the
whole of the working age population (the final line of Table 8),
the expenditure on Tax Credits is higher in older industrial towns
than in the main regional cities or London, and higher than the
GB average.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE CITIES
In recent years the dominant view within economic geography
(Jacobs, 1986; Krugman, 1991; Centre for Cities, 2015) and in
policy making (HM Government, 2011; Core Cities, 2013) has
been that cities are the motor of regional and local growth.
By implication, surrounding industrial towns are increasingly
expected to function as their satellites, providing a source of labor
and an overspill location for businesses. This is very different
from the way in which Britain’s industrial towns first developed,
when they were nearly all locations of business growth in their
own right.
What is undeniable is that approaching three-quarters of the
population of Britain’s older industrial towns listed earlier in
Table 1 live in the immediate hinterland of the main regional
cities. Only the remaining quarter live in towns located further
afield—places such as Barrow in Cumbria or Grimsby on the
south bank of the Humber, or smaller cities such as Hull,
Swansea, Dundee, and Stoke on Trent that stand at some distance
from the main regional cities.
The evidence on job growth in the final years of the twentieth
century and the early years of the 21st did not support the view
that employment in the UK’s main regional cities was growing
consistently faster than elsewhere (Champion and Townsend,
2011, 2013; Martin et al., 2014). More recent trends, however,
show that job growth in the cities is now substantially faster
than in Britain’s older industrial towns. As Table 9 shows, this is
especially marked when the growth is expressed in relation to the
resident working age population. On this measure, between 2010
and 2019 job growth in the main regional cities was five times
faster than in older industrial towns, and nearly six times faster
in London.
In a small country such as the UK, with high car ownership
and a network of public transport, the labor markets of cities
and surrounding towns are inevitably strongly intertwined, as
Swinney et al. (2018) have documented. This can be an asset
for some older industrial towns if they are close to a city with
a strong economy but a problem for others if they are further
away or if their neighboring city is less prosperous. Additionally,
Pike et al. (2016) identified ‘overshadowed cities’ (most of which
are actually large towns)—that is, cities with a larger neighbor
that hosts higher-level functions and provides development
opportunities—as one of the categories of UK places facing
relative decline.
The labor market links between older industrial towns and
neighboring areas are certainly strong. Annual Population Survey
data for 2019 puts the total net commuting out of older industrial
towns at 1.06 million, equivalent to 14% of all residents in
employment. Not all the commuting will have been into the
main regional cities but this figure is a net flow—the daily
TABLE 9 | Increase in employment in area, 2010–2019.
No. As % of working age pop.
London 900,000 16.3
Main regional cities 500,000 14.2
Great Britain 2,880,000 7.4
Older industrial towns 290,000 2.8
Source: Annual Population Survey.
flow outwards will be significantly larger, offset in part by
in-commuting. Looking at commuting flows from the other
direction, in 2019 the 10 main regional cities had a net in-
flow of 990,000 commuters, equivalent to 27% of all the jobs
located there.
Net out-commuting from Britain’s older industrial towns
rose by 200,000 between 2010 and 2019, and net in-commuting
to the main regional cities rose by 100,000 over the same
period. Around Manchester, Edinburgh and Cardiff there is
clear evidence of rising in-flows of commuters from older
industrial towns in surrounding areas (Beatty and Fothergill,
2020) but in these cities the growth in employment has
been especially strong and the corresponding growth in their
older industrial hinterlands (e.g., in Cardiff ’s case the Welsh
Valleys) has been poor. Elsewhere the gap in job growth has
been more modest and the changes in commuting patterns
more complex.
London’s particularly rapid growth—an additional 900,000
jobs between 2010 and 2019—has however had little impact on
older industrial towns. Because of the distances involved it was
always unrealistic to expect that London’s growth would attract
daily commuters from beyond the south of England, though there
are undoubtedly Monday-to-Friday flows from longer distance
into the capital. London’s rapid job growth might however have
been expected to attract a net inflow of migrants from older
industrial towns in the rest of the country. In practice this has
not happened because the London economy has tapped other
sources of additional labor: a large net inflow of international
migrants, a surge in commuting from the rest of southern
England, rising labor force participation among London residents
and a natural increase in the size of the local workforce that
reflects a population skewed toward younger groups. The balance
of internal migration (i.e., the flow of UK residents) has actually
been strongly out of London (Beatty and Fothergill, 2020).
London it seems is no longer acting as a powerful magnet
for migrants from the older industrial towns of the Midlands,
North, Scotland and Wales, in effect detaching its growth from
the labormarket north of a line from the Severn to theWash. This
observation from the post-financial crisis years confirms a trend
first identified in the previous decade: the net flow of internal
migrants into London and the South of England has essentially
come to a halt (Rowthorn, 2010).
ASSESSMENT
Let us now draw some overall conclusions. The first is that
set against the backdrop of years of massive industrial job loss,
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the labor market in Britain’s older industrial towns is not as
distressed as might have been feared. In some towns, it is
worth remembering, virtually the whole of the original economic
base has disappeared and this might have been expected to
have resulted in permanent mass unemployment or large-scale
depopulation. In fact, taking Britain’s older industrial towns as a
whole, prior to the coronavirus crisis the unemployment rate was
only a little higher than the national average.
Britain’s older industrial towns are not, it seems, locked into
a spiral of decline. It might have been expected that the loss of
most of their former industrial base, which in historical terms
happened quite recently, might have triggered a longer-term
knock-on loss of jobs, in the local service sector for example
as a result of reduced local spending-power. If these negative
consequences are still happening in the towns they have so far
been offset by other more positive developments, including no
doubt the impact of substantial public sector efforts to rebuild
their local economies. On balance, the number of jobs in Britain’s
older industrial towns was growing prior to the coronavirus
crisis, though more slowly than elsewhere.
The second conclusion is that even if conditions in Britain’s
older industrial towns are not as bad as they might have been, the
labor market in the towns still remains difficult. This is evident
not only in below-par employment rates but also in the very large
numbers on incapacity benefits, in low pay, the predominance of
manual jobs and a high dependence on in-work welfare benefits.
In many respects this is ‘the long shadow of job loss.’
Until very recently, perhaps, the nature of the problem has
been different from what it was 20 or 30 years ago. Even allowing
for distortions to the official figures, unemployment in the towns
was down on peak levels and down on the immediate post-
financial crisis years. For many of the workless the problem is
therefore likely to have been not that they could not find any job
at all, which was probably the case in the era of 3 million claimant
unemployed, but rather that they had difficulty finding suitable
work with acceptable pay and conditions. In older industrial
towns there have simply not been enough of these ‘good’ jobs
to satisfy everyone, not least because the destruction of so much
industry over so many years has removed the layer of jobs that
once filled this important gap in the labor market. The new
recession, triggered by coronavirus, looks likely to bring back
older difficulties, at least for some while.
The third conclusion is that to describe most of these towns as
‘post-industrial’ is inaccurate. Certainly, they have lost most if not
all the industry that underpinned their original growth but the
figures here show that manufacturing, energy and water together
still account for 15% of local employment—nearly four times
the proportion in London and twice the proportion in the main
regional cities. Add in the now numerous jobs in warehousing—
just another ‘industry’ to many residents, no doubt, and a major
element of the economy in several former coalfields—and the
proportion would be significantly higher.
The point here is that Britain’s older industrial towns remain
the heartland of British manufacturing. Unlike the big regional
cities, and London in particular, which have shed most of their
former industrial jobs and become centers of banking, business
services and higher education, many of Britain’s older industrial
towns remain to an important extent ‘industrial’ with economies
that still depend on the local and national performance of
this sector.
The fourth conclusion is that Britain’s older industrial towns
need to be understood in their wider geographical context.
They do not exist in isolation from the places around them,
in particular from neighboring cities. They are increasingly
becoming dormitories for men and women who work elsewhere,
partly no doubt because the on-going slack in the local
labor market encourages commuting to neighboring areas and
further afield.
The scale of commuting should be kept in perspective: the
net outflow from the towns is presently just over a million
whereas nearly seven and a half million residents of the towns
are in work. Moreover, it is not always the big regional
cities that are the destination and there is no evidence at
all that London’s spectacular recent growth has been of any
direct benefit to the labor market in Britain’s older industrial
towns. Nevertheless, commuting on this scale represents a
significant redefinition of the role of the towns within wider
urban networks.
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